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n a letter to Hugh Blair in May of 1767, David Hume
comments in reference to the Remarks that although
Rousseau "is plainly mad...The Pamphlet you mention
was wrote by one as mad as himself."' Henry Fuseli's
anonymous critique of his own anonymous work in the Critical Review
of that same month hints at the quiet distance newly established
between the tyro and his hero after the quarrel between Hume and
Rousseau erupted into public spectacle. Nonetheless, the Remarks

' David Humeto Hugh Blair, London, 20 May1767, TheCollected EnglishLetters of Henry Fuseli,
ed. David H. Weinglass (Millwood, New York; Kraus International, 1982), 8-9.
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indicate a personal concern in the Hume/Rousseau dispute important
for a young man who had not yet chosen art over literature. Though
the book played no direct role in the dispute (it was published after the
fact), tht Remarks anticipate the later complexity of Fuseli's intermedial
subjects.^
As is the particular case with the frontispiece (engraved after Fuseli
by Charles Grignion),' the iconographic layout shapes understanding
of the later textual account of Rousseau's work through its interposi
tion. Fuseli's "captioning" of the frontispiece to the Remarks not only
frames the reader's perception of the text, but through its allusiveness
attempts to resolve competing sentiments toward Rousseau. It is
intermedial through its liminal prospect for the reader and in its
drawing upon an existing set of signifiers "captioned" by popular
culture. For example, Voltaire's letter printed in The British Magazine
of April, 1766, mercilessly whips Rousseau and his doctrines:
As my dear brethren, I have long laboured to make you
both foolish and ignorant, I now die with the consolation of
having succeeded. You are sensible that I have established
houses of entertainment where you may drink away your
reason, but no academies where it might be cultivated: in
fact, one drunken man is happier than twenty philoso
phers...in short, wine and ignorance make up the sum of all
my doctrines.''
Furthermore, as David Weinglass has shown, James Boswell's The
Savage Man, published in January of 1767, satirizes Rousseau in
particular through its centering of his caricature.^ Although the title
does not specifically identify which of the figures is "the savage man,"
the implication is nonetheless clear: the figure of Rousseau, though

^ For a full discussion of intermediality, see Peter Wagner's Readingkonotexts: From Swift to the
French Revolution (London: Reaktion Books, 1995).
' David Weinglass, Prints and Engraved Illustrations by and after Henry Fuseli (Aldershot: Scolar
Press, 1994), 9. I am particularly indebted to Professor Weinglass for his groundbreaking
scholarship on Henry Fuseli and for his provision of the illustrations which accompany this
article.
•' F. M. A. Voltaire, "A Letter from Mr. Voltaire to Mr. Jean Jacques Rousseau," The British
Magazine (April 1766): 212.
^ Weinglass, Prints and Engraved Illustrations, 10.
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standing fully upright, is nearly naked, while three small simian
creatures in the background seem to attend him. The figure of Hume,
crying "I will whip him into Humanity," implies that "culture" is a
higher developmental state than "primitiveness." But the crux of the
matter for Boswell, as for Fuseli, is the idea that innate goodness and
cultivated society are entirely separate.
Significantly, Fuseli's frontispiece includes only Rousseau and
Voltaire. The "missing" Hume puts the emphasis more clearly on
Voltaire's role in corrupting the public view of Rousseau. That
Rousseau is dressed in his preferred Armenian garb in the Fuseli
illustration (as opposed to his near-naked portrayal in The Savage Mari)
demonstrates an attempt to restore some dignity to the exile, while
Voltaire's pose astride the grazing figure carries a cruelty more obvious
than its predecessor. In the Boswell print, Voltaire's intended whip
ping seems calculated to restore order or discipline to the figure of
Rousseau. Fuseli, on the other hand, creates a competing perspective,
one in which it is perhaps Voltaire who is the lunatic, "dressed in a fine
flowing peruke, with a pair of jackboots and spurs, and a whip in his
hand."^ Though Fuseli endorses Rousseau's separation of art from
morality, the Remarks refine the distinction by showing not only that
culture does not necessarily produce "humaneness," but that it
potentially rationalizes cruelty: "whether you sway society, or guide
the plough, whether you scatter passions round ye, or anatomise the
prism of a moth—whether you write a book or read one—be humane."^
Furthermore, Fuseli's review, like the illustration, reversesthe Voltairecreated perception that Rousseau commands a return to primitiveness.
Instead, he argues like Rousseau against the misappropriation of culture
for inhumane ends, against reducing humankind into "a mon
ster...bridled, saddled and brought to the ground."* The Remarks
begins by explaining that

'[Henry Fuseli], review of Remarks on the Writingsand Conduct of J.J. Rousseau, Critical Review
(May 1967). See Eudo C. Mason, The Mind of Henry Fuseli (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1951) or David Weinglass, Prints and Engraved Illustrations byand after Henry Fuseli (Aldershot;
Scolar Press, 1994) for secondary sources and comment.
'[Henry Fuseli], Remarks onthe Writings and Conduct of], J. Rousseau (London: T. Cadell, 1766;
reprint, ed. by Eudo C. Mason, Zurich: Fretz & Wasmuth Verlag, 1962), 70.
* [Fuseli], review of Remarks-, Mason, The Mind of Henry Fuseli, 136; Weinglass, Prints, 10.
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science or truth methodized—is the attribute of God;—that to
investigate the nature of things with the mind...is the sublimest characteristick of man—as the arts, directed to the ends
nature meant them for, are the joys, the comfort of life; he
[Rousseau] said that there is a brutal ignorance as destructive
to the morals of mankind as ignominious to human genius.'

Because of the "prejudices occasioned partly by the confusion of his
adversaries,'"" Fuseli foimd in Rousseau's work and conduct the perfect
opportunity to examine the conflicting sentiments which produce art.
As the frontispiece to the Remarks intimates, Voltaire is the
destroyer of morals, not Rousseau. Like other critics, Albert Boime
relates it to the Lettre au Docteur Pansophe. But perhaps because he
favors a political interpretation of Fuseli's Nightmare, he attempts to
frame the illustration's importance in terms of Fuseli's early use "of the
female figure to personify abstract social and political ideas."" Though
no doubt this interpretation carries some merit, it also neglects the text
of which the illustration is a part. While Fuseli's review of the Remarks
does discuss Rousseau's victimization for his political ideas in that he
is "of the opinion that he [Voltaire] ought to be hanged in their stead,""
he also tends to distance himself from their application in the work
itself:
The simplicity, the clear filiation of ideas in the Contraa
Social, must be confusion in our order of things; the discourse
on Qeconomy in the state, may be looked upon as superflu
ous; the Projet de Paix is the dream of a purblind schemer; the
Letters from the Mountain have overturned Geneva, say
those who call Liberty reclaiming her rights, rebellion; and
even his friends must be content with applying to him what
Cicero said of the younger Cato: "He does more harm than
good; for he mistakes the dregs of Romulus, for Plato's
republic."
' Remarks, 70
Remarks, 70.
" Albert Boime, Art inan AgeofRevolution, 17S9-1800 (Chicago; University of Chicago Press,
1987), 285.
" Review of Remarks.
" Remarks, 88.
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While there may be no "necessary" or natural connection between
virtue and culture in a progressive sense, the independence of the two
ideas likewise suggests that the primitive state described by Rousseau is
not inherently virtuous merely because culture has been abused by
reason toward inhumane ends. Though "true politicks are to a
corrupted state what the physic of youth is to decrepitude," still "little
can be learnt now from the Political Writings of Rousseau."" The
hanging figures of Justice and Liberty have been done in by Voltaire,
but that does not necessarily imply that Fuseli embraced radical
politics, only that the philosophes carried the misrepresentation of
Rousseau's ideas to a cruel extreme.
In the lower left hand corner of the design, an accusatory
Rousseau, who seems on the verge of sneaking away, identifies the
philosophical villain with a pointing finger. As this depiction indicates,
herein lies the problem for Fuseli: rather than act as a real hero ought,
Rousseau will not strive with those who would deride him. This
passive-aggressive tendency in Rousseau makes him an inappropriate
hero, but one might speculate that it foreshadows the same strain of
emasculatory domination in Fuseli's later work. Indeed, the very
anonymity of the Remarks and its subsequent review may be an early
manifestation of Fuseli's later inclusion of voyeur figures in his work.
As he observes, Rousseau misunderstood the English, fleeing because
of "the same dark ignorance" that "tattle[s] to parrots encaged;"'^ that
is, from the sensationalism created in the British press rather than from
Hume's real intent:
It is clear that an utter ignorance of the private and public
manners of the English was the first foundation of Rousseau's
suspicions. He should have known that the English have no
compliments for their friends;—hence the pretended neglect
of salutations: —that they are extremely shy to address, or to
enter into conversation with a foreigner, even if he speaks the
language...he should have known that the public papers are
the hobby horse of the nation—whilst at the same time they
are the bog of the public;—hence he should have laughed at

" Remarks, 88
Remarks, 97.
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their contents, equally insensitive of their encomiums and
scandal.'^

The irony lies in Fuseli's quote from Rousseau's letters, in which the
Frenchman explains that "If you burn all tiresome books, what would
become of libraries?'"^ It is important to note that while the figure of
Voltaire carries a raised whip, the passive Rousseau almost hides his
plumb line from view as the rider turns away with an expression of
bemused superiority. Fuseli shows a cruel Voltaire, but he also shows
a pusillanimous Rousseau. The rather curious dark and erect tree to the
left of the illustration that serves as a backdrop for Rousseau accentu
ates his bent posture even further, and sharply contrasts in size with the
imagined rigidity of the "plummet line"" he carries.
Fuseli was certainly disappointed that his hero had been made the
object of scorn. Nevertheless, one of the aims of the Remarks was to
correct the Voltaire-slanted perception of the public that Rousseau's
call for a return to "native" simplicity would be tantamount in English
terms to "eat[ing] grass in Hyde Park, or acorns in Windsor Forest.""
As early as 1734, Voltaire had attacked Rousseau (among many others)
in The Temple of Taste, an allegorical mock epic of sorts in which
Criticism "orders the gate to be open'd, that she might see the Animal
[Rousseau], who had so remarkable a Cry."^° Rousseau did not
advocate the overthrow of reason and a return to "primitiveness." On
the contrary, he urged only that human action be governed by decency
rather than strict law, a reflection perhaps of Fuseli's own heroic
pamphleteering with Lavater and Hess in Zurich. As Boime explains,
it was not a corrupt institution that Fuseli and his friends attacked but
a single official.^^ Hence his pronouncement in chapter one of the
Remarks, that "he [Rousseau] said not that in our present state of
society the sciences and arts were to be proscribed.

" Remarks, 97.
" Remarks, 99.
" Review oi Remarks. This phrase is a synonymous with "plumb-line."
" Voltaire, "Letter to Mr. J.J. Rousseau," 212.
® Voltaire, "The Temple of Taste" {UM), Early Eighteenth-Century Essays on Taste, ed. Thomas
B. Gilmore (Delmar, New York: Scholars' Press, 1972), 319.
Boime, 212.
" Remarks, 70.
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Figure 1. Frontispiece for Fuseli's Remarks (1767),
Justice and Liberty Hanged, while Voltaire Rides Monster Humanity and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau Takes his Measure (Charles Grignon, Engraver,
after a design by Fuseli)
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Figure 2. Anonymous engraver, after a design by James Boswell,
The Savage Man (1767)
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Fuseli caps the gibbet with a remotely neoclassical edifice with
closed gates, a sign that the populist ideas of Rousseau have been
excluded from the more conservative society of the philosophes.
Though Fuseli calls this building the "temple of Liberty" in his review,
it also recalls Voltaire's Temple of Taste. Fuseli makes the relationship
between taste and liberty explicit in the Remarks when he comments
that one must never "suffer ambition and vanity to subvert moral
sense."^' That is, "taste," as used by Voltaire, symbolizes for Fuseli the
appropriation of the arts for the subversion of liberty. Fuseli evidently
agrees with Rousseau that the misappropriation of reason occurs
through the failure to recognize that it is "inhabited by the pas
sions—the parental, the domestic, the civil relations of social man.^^^
But this "political" sentiment does not describe a radical Fuseli. Instead,
he calls for a recognition that reason does not lead to perfectibility; for
"God, being conscious of man's being not the thing for reproducing
goodness—took such a trust from fathers, mothers, &c. &c. &c.—-and
lodged it in baptism. Indeed, any correlation of taste and virtue, as
Edmund Burke explains, "does not depend upon a superior principle in
men, but upon superior knowledge:"^^ ignorance is Fuseli's enemy, and
Voltaire's misrepresentation of Rousseau obscures the value of the
exile's aesthetic breakthrough when "crashing" the "temple of taste."
Nonetheless, as early as 1765 Fuseli had expressed doubt about
Rousseau's discretion. In a letter to Dalliker in November of that year,
he writes, "I agree with you that Rousseau would have done better to
keep some of his tenets to himself, however clearly demonstrated they
were."^^ Later in the same letter, he implies a connection between
Rousseau and Christ, setting up the tension that would emerge in the
Remarks as a ratification of art's independence from the cultural
boundaries of the surrounding world:

Remarks, 78.
" Remarks, 74.
" Remarks, 78.
Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Suhlime and Beautiful
(London, 1757; reprint, ed. by James T. Boulton, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1938;
reprint, 1967), 19.
Henry Fuseli to Dalliker, November 1765, The Mind of Henry Fuseli, ed. Eudo C. Mason
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), 122.
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But then I do not see why Jesus Christ sent forth the dog
matic and mystical part of his religion into the wide world,
since...it has so far either proved and still proves to be the
source of all the schisms, blasphemies, ravings, absurdities,
bloodshed and atrocities of those signed with the cross, or
else diminishes our devotion to his divine morality.^^

The distinction Fuseli makes is between doctrine and the use of it.
Insofar that both men preach that moral truth and virtue are com
pletely independent of science and art, Fuseli's work, like that of
Rousseau, embraces the lack of "necessary connection." In a footnote
to A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, Rousseau writes.
It is related that the Caliph Omar, being asked what should
be done with the library at Alexandria, answered in these
words: "If the books in the library contain anything con
trary to the Alcoran, they are evil and ought to be burnt; if
they contain only what the Alcoran teaches, they are super
fluous.^'
The "moral" of the narrative is simply that the virtue represented by
the arts and sciences degenerates into a function of power and accreted
culture and is not the product of reasoned enlightenment. More
specifically, Rousseau echoes David Hume in claiming this lack of
necessary connection between culture and morality, explaining that
"Where there is not effect, it is idle to look for a cause: but here the
effect is certain and the depravity actual; our minds have been cor
rupted in proportion as the arts and sciences have improved."'® The
aesthetic breakthrough made by Rousseau is that there is no link
between virtue and cultural accouterment. This lack of causation or
"lack of necessary harmony" between inward "virtue" and it external
social manifestations marks the great divide from the neoclassical; like
Fuseli, Rousseau separates materialist display from social virtue:

^ Fuseli, in Mason, 122.
" Jean Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences," TTie Social Contract and
Discourses, Trans. G.D.H. Cole (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1950), 171.
Rousseau, 150.
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[A]ll the states supported by trade, luxury, and arts, [he
explains] have been corrupted, have died of a surfeit...whilst
those whom necessity or accident had confined to their
primitive light of nature, preserved liberty with mediocrity,
and with ignorance and poverty their ignorance of manners;
he [Rousseau] drew the pedigree of the sciences and arts;
showed them grafted on luxury and leisure, those on riches,
and wealth on inequality;—and from all this he concluded,
that every society supported by their fickle props, resembles
a palace founded on the Roman order...; that having weak
ened the spirit of nations, enervated genius, drawn humanity
from its real object, substituted visionary bliss for real
happiness, fettered the mind to unnatural wants, and adulter
ated the manners."
However, Fuseli defends the converse of Rousseau's argument, that the
arts are a necessarily corrupting force. Voltaire's reductio ad absurdum
of Rousseau's philosophy missed the point that "ignorance...[is]...not
a positive standard of virtue"'^ but entirely separate from it. Though
Fuseli's work reflecteda fresh concern for the imagination, he remained
firmly rooted in the quotidian necessities of patronage and "politics,"
an adaptation that Rousseau would never make.
Regarding the arts, Fuseli takes pains to make a distinction
between the misperception of Rousseau as anti-cultural and Rousseau's
real struggle to wrest control of art from the hands of a decadent elite
attempting to historicize its anxiety of empire through the collection
of neoclassical pastiche. Rather than proclaim the arts as decadent, he
proclaimed the patrons of the arts as decadent, who, "like rosy
harlots,...give momentary springs and elasticity to those limbs which
their abyss of pleasures sucked into languishment and impotence."^'
That is, it is not the arts that breed corruption in humanity, but the
appropriation of the arts for corrupt purposes. Like the victimization
of Rousseau, or like the victimization of Fuseli's idea of Rousseau, the
arts should maintain their independence from a civic order that would
sully them. The "natural state" discussed by Rousseau, in Fuseli's

" Remarks, 71.
Remarks, 70.
" Remarks, 71.
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aesthetic, would be one largely unshackled from fashion (with the
notable exception of his characteristically stylized women's hair).
From this aesthetic seed springs Fuseli's later conception of art as a
construction of sensation serving the imagination and not fettered to a
neoclassical harmony of form; in this sense, it is sublime in that it
reduces myth to its timeless essence, using the close-fitting ahistorical
drapery of human figures and scant backgrotmd to focus the eye on
universal human confrontations rather than those bound by custom or
culture.
This separation of art from morality made by Rousseau (note the
distinction between morality and humane action)—the idea that art is
autonomous—means also that it is not for the masses, that in order to
prevent the appropriation of it for self-aggrandizing ends, it must he
guarded by a "priesthood" of sorts. In its most extreme interpretation,
the egalitarianism of Rousseau is not "equality" in the strictest sense of
a non-hierarchical Utopia; rather, it leads uncomfortably to a kind of
benign totalitarianism, governed by the idea of harmony of parts
balanced to maximize man's dominion within nature. Thus Fuseli can
defend his elitist sentiments under the guise of social necessity, saving
it from the profanation of parental pride, and pert pretense;
from the itch of mere curiosity, and the waste of leisure; from
the skimming of fashion, and the brazen memory of dunces;
and the more useful departments of life would not be
continually emptying to recruit the armies of Penchewers.''*
Specifically, art must be saved from the ignorance of the likes of
Voltaire. Though Fuseli clearly identifies himself with an elite, he
intimates that art should promote an integration of the whole person,
a tactic similar to the Renaissance rationalization of social station, but
without the appropriation of reason for inhumane ends. As Eudo
Mason has aptly noted, the review to the Remarks avoids equating the
"monster" with "humanity." Like Voltaire, Fuseli would have a
"temple of taste," but one guarded by "true genius" and not by Grub
Street or "Pickardy hacks." Being learned does not make one wise, and
consuming the products of reason does not make one reasonable.

'•* Remarks, 72.
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Fuseli agrees with Rousseau that the arts and sciences have the
potential to create an imbalance in society. Echoing Swift, he writes
that "The only effectual means, in my opinion, for preserving its
[writing's] dignity and usefulness to Learning...[is]...to make it the
privilege of Genius."" This pragmatic strain—that education is useless
without the guidance of wisdom—explains Fuseli's concern that
educational "enlightenment" carries the potential to become perverted
into what Rousseau would call "External ornaments." But what Fuseli
comments on is the ornamentation of learning and the confusion of it
with virtue. Art and science have become poses adopted by an elite
under the guise of decorum, and as Rousseau declares, "In our day, now
that a more subtle study and a more refined taste has reduced the art of
pleasing to a system, there prevails in modern manners a servile and
deceptive conformity; so that one would think every mind had been
cast in the same mold.'"^ Virtue has been separated from man by the
decorum of society, which has degenerated into an illegitimate
appropriation of taste and manners in an exercise of power. Foreshad
owing the later aesthetic of Fuseli, Rousseau further remarks that "The
honest man is an athlete, who loves to wrestle stark naked; he scorns
all those vile trappings, which prevent the exertion of his strength, and
were, for the most part, invented only to conceal some deformity.
Likewise, reason and virtue are not united; the neoclassical style of
calmness of manner, the statuesque poses, and uniform lighting all serve
to conceal the tension of their posing. To this extent, the Remarks
speak against the inhumanity of Voltaire's unwarranted ridicule of the
exile, even while critiquing Rousseau's failure to defend his ideas.
There is a seeming leap from the early caricatures of Fuseli, which
reveal the inner deformity of the model, to some moment when he
realized that art carries the potential to disguise rather than express
with ornamentation. But as David Weinglass clarifies in his discussion
of Fuseli's early work, his "apparently most realistic sketches, such as
the precocious teenager's remarkable gallery of Swiss artists at work in
their studios, prove not to be from life at all."^® As Fuseli describes it,
Rousseau "traced man to the nipple of nature, found him wrapped up

Remarks, 72.
" Rousseau, 149.
" Rousseau, 148.
" Weinglass, Prints, xii.
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in instinct,—taught his lore by appetite and fear—harmless because
content—content because void of comparative ideas—solitary, because
without wants,—snatching the moment on the wing, from the past and
future ones."^' More specifically, to paint "virtue" is to paint not from
nature but from the imagination. There is no "necessary connection"
because reason shapes the perception of nature, impeding actualization
of the heroic moment through extraneous ornamentation. Though
Fuseli doubts the educational scheme in Emile, perhaps because it
ignores potential "evil" in the "natural man," he nonetheless explains
the effect of the appropriation of the arts in that they can be used to
separate humanity from humaneness. As Rousseau demonstrates.
The question is no longer whether a man is honest, but
whether he is clever. We do not ask whether a book is
useful, but whether it is well-written. Rewards are lavished
on wit and ingenuity, while virtue is left unhonored. There
are a thousand prizes for fine discourses, and none for good
actions.'*"
Once again, one sees the undermining of art by science and progress
under the pretense of virtue. As Fuseli advises, "you must call into
your assistance the mass of good in man and society, produce a
coalition of nature and art, but never suffer ambition and vanity to
subvert moral sense.'"" The aesthetic which emerges from this precept
allows for guidance by reason albeit "its feeble light can only make
darkness visible,'"*^ an allusion to the burning lake of Paradise Lost from
which Satan unchains himself. Like Milton, Fuseli refines away the
qualities of pretense, exposing the conflicting elements that the
connection between virtue and culture disguises. But for Fuseli, reason
and emotion always conflict; as Ffume implies, if reason and sensation
are not necessarily connected, and one's actions derive from sensation,
then there is no reason to presume that left on his own, man would
develop virtue. Instead, only culture and decorum would arise, an
arrangement that Rousseau of conceived as a function of social power.

" Remarks, 75.
* Rousseau, 168.
Remarks, 77-78.
" Remarks, 80.

Intermediality in Fuseli

313

One of the most direct statements Fuseli makes in the Remarks
regarding this unnecessary connection between "virtue" and art is his
comment on the letter to d'Alembert:
There is, in Tragedy chiefly, such a disparity between the
spectator's and hero's circumstances, that it requires the most
painful abstraction to snatch one useful lesson from all the
flatulency of his passion. The truth is, the most striking play
may be written without any good tendency at all; hold the
mirrour up to life, give action, draw characters, and your
play is good.'''
This idea of art is not didactic in the Horatian sense; if it is didactic at
all, it is Socratic in that it raises questions about the most commonly
perceived links between social codes and virtue. For Fuseli, one of the
purposes of the arts is to create "ignorance," exposing the conflict
inherent in Hume's demonstration that the "data" of reason stem from
subjective associations. As Rousseau suggests, "The less we know, the
more we think we know.'"''' For some, the purpose of art is merely
entertainment. For Fuseli, it is a confrontation with and an explora
tion of received principles, a re-evaluation of the connections between
morality and society.
Fuseli further defines this construct of artificial virtue standing in
opposition to real moral sense in his comment on La Nouvelle Heloise:
whatever boy or girl proved haggard, 'twas a changling, an
abortion, substituted by an incubus;—and sometimes a tender
religious mother would carry her offspring to the next
bridge, to know whether it was a goblin she was going to
suckle or her own child. In the first case, the little monster,
whistled at by the legion in the water, would jump out of the
basket and plunge to join his brethren; in the other, the child
would cross himself.—It may, and with charity too, be
presumed, that the number of devil-brats somewhat exceeded
that of babies.'"

•" Remarks, 86.
" Rousseau, 159.
•*' Remarks, 82.
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The obvious satire shows human decency separated from a socially
imposed "virtue." To blame art (in this case, La Nouvelle Heloise) for
the indiscretion of a young woman, displays the clear imposition by
"reason" on a common "indiscretion." The point is not whether the
woman committed a "sin." Instead, Fuseli reveals the perversion of art
when used as a tool to obfuscate the truth of the situation—that here is
a young mother, driven to murder her infant out of an imposed sense
of religious propriety. Fuseli's footnote is enlightening: "The truth is,
there are few who do not grind their taste for beauty on gross appetite,
and fewer who build virtue on conscience...you'll find that we all hate
to serve God for nothing.'"*^ In other words, art ends up being
appropriated as a mode of flattery and reward for one's imagined virtue
while denying the "monsters" that lurk within. Fuseli's implication of
Voltaire's perverse cruelty in the frontispiece to the Remarks confirms
the perverse cruelty of building the "temple of taste" as a model of
repression. The faculty of reason is not "rational" because it always
perceives correctly; it carries the potential to create connections where
none exist, as in the false connection between decorum and virtue. In
Fuseli's work, one sees the converse of this "darkness visible;" the
shadows hide the "obvious" connections structuring one's perceptions,
and when he reduces light and ornament in his most sublime work, it
is so that the sensations freely acknowledge the hamartia that reduces
greatness to a human and comprehensible level.
It would of course be overly reductive to confine Fuseli's aesthetic
development to this single pamphlet; nonetheless, it does interpret the
heroic as a complex embodiment of contradiction. The much later
words of Byron's Abbot in Manfred echo the clashing dynamism of
Fuseli's developing thoughts on Rousseau:
This should have been a noble creature: he Hath all the
energy which would have made a goodly frame of glorious
elements, had they been wisely mingled; as it is, it is an awful
chaos—light and darkness—and mind and dust—and passions
and pure thoughts, mixed and contending without end or
order."""

Remarks, 84.
" George Gordon, Lord Byron. "Manfred" (1817), 160-66.
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Fuseli would later portray in his literary subjects conflicts similar to the
one he explores between Rousseau's heroic dimensions and the human
weakness that would inevitably lead to his downfall:
exhausted, and unequal to the visionary task, [he] grew
anxiously suspicious of the world around him, and suffering
the prudence of virtue to be swallowed by pusillanimous
scrupulosity, made it a duty to be for ever on the alarm,—to
lie on the torture of a restless fancy—to fear all in order to
ward all. Thus creating monsters of his own—he sunk under
his own blows and betrayed himself.''®
This attempt to caption the heroic by weighing its contradiaions makes
the Remarks, like a significant portion of Fuseli's artistic oeuvre,
necessarily intermedial because he freely drew from a wide variety of
signifiers. One cannot examine his work without referencing the vast
body of literature he read, nor can one read his written compositions
without examining the coexistent effect of his art.

•" Remarks, 101-02.

